

What have different philosophical traditions to say about temporal thought?

The fragmentation of philosophy throughout the 20th century has remarkably interrupted the consistency of the history of philosophy. So, much knowledge has been forgotten, and much research, allegedly new, often is something already undertaken. The tendency to an endless specialisation brings to build walls of non-communication and non-awareness.

In the case of current philosophy of mind, in my paper I want to show how some of its main concepts have been already treated in the Aristotelian tradition as merged with the 20th century philosophy of language by philosopher Herbert McCabe, one of the so-called grammatical Thomists. The concepts of '*de se*' and '*de nunc*' beliefs correspond to those of '*virtus aestimativa*' and 'sense-memory'. And the concepts of '*de re*' beliefs and '*qualia*' correspond to those of 'intellectual memory' and 'universals'.

We human beings are animals, and, like many other mammals, we have five external and four interior senses. The five external sense are on the surface of the animal's body, whereas the interior ones are inside, in the brain. The first of the latter set is '*sensus communis*', which receives sense-images (the sensations 'in act', that is, in the very moment they are produced) and put sight, hearing, smell and taste in relation with the most fundamental sense, that is, touch.

The second interior sense is 'imagination' because we humans, like other animals, also seek what is not currently present and affecting us through the external senses; this is the reason why imagination 'stores' and preserves images: for instance, into my nervous system I have stored the visual image of the face of the student sitting next to the wall when he was starting answering to my first question, and, similar to this one, many billions of other images.

The third interior sense is '*sensus aestimativus*', coming from the mind faculty that Avicenna called '*virtus aestimativa*'. This sense is an evaluation of the world which makes us feel either attraction or repulsion for the various sense experiences of our life. This faculty is the central one in the animal's mind which makes the individual animal feel as an individual being over against what is other-than-itself. In the indexical thought nomenclature this is the cause of the '*de se*' statements.

The fourth interior sense is 'sense-memory': just as imagination stores sense-images, so sense-memory stores the tendencies evoked by the evaluation of the world, that is, all the many singular attractions and repulsions perceived (and made) by the '*virtus aestimativa*'. This memory allows sentient animals to have a sense of the past, and, therefore, an awareness of themselves as individuals throughout the passing of time. In fact, the images themselves are not connected to autobiography: you can imagine a scene without your presence to it, whereas to claim to remember a scene is related to having been present to it and having reacted to what was around as attractive or repulsive, friend or enemy. In indexical thought nomenclature this is the cause of all the '*de nunc*' statements.

However, in certain animals, that is the human beings, there is also another memory, which is not a sense, that is, which is not related to an evaluation of evils and goods as perceived by our senses. In order to distinguish it from the sense-memory, we can call it 'intellectual memory', because it does not store sensations, but 'thoughts'. In fact, for instance, I always remember that $2+2=4$, regardless from the experiences of my past life; whereas, by the means of sense-memory, I can remember the attractions and repulsions (for people, tasks, speeches, images, physical environment, ideologies, etc.) I experienced during that particular situation of my past life when I learnt that $2+2=4$. Therefore, there must be a human mental faculty which is not a sense, and which we can call 'intellect' or 'thinking'. In indexical thought nomenclature this is the '*de re*' statement.

According to De Saussure, Wittgenstein and McCabe thought and language are just one thing and not two. The brain stores the individual sense-images, the system of language articulates thoughts.

However, what is thought as distinct from sensation?

Plato, Aristotle and medieval philosophers say: a thought (idea, concept) is a '*universale*', that is, a class, a set, a non-individual entity. The concept of 'spoon' is the set or group of some individual entities that exist qua individuals (unique, unrepeatable) within the extra mental world, but which, within mental world, we group into the same set because of certain characteristics that we think are present within these individuals. As for this example: 'spoon' = 'stiff, indented, handleable tool meant to bring edible liquids towards the mouth during meals'.

A concept (idea, thought, '*universale*') can be predicated of an indefinite number of individuals; that is to say, we can 'think' or describe an indefinite number of individuals in the same way. "*Universale est quod potest predicari de pluribus*". In indexical though nomenclature the *universalia* are the '*qualia*'.

I hold that Aristotelian philosophy of mind as implemented with 20th century philosophy of language in McCabe's synthesis is a true and plausible means to achieve the following aim: to consider ways in which we might reframe the discussion of *de nunc* thought on its own terms.

In fact, according to this theory the 'de re' thought exists just as a linguistic entity within the objective system of a given historical language. Therefore, this idea also implies that 'de se' thought does not have an independent autonomy in the realm of 'pure' (disembodied) thought. Whereas, '*de nunc*' thought is actually more independent from the 'de re' thought than the '*de se*' thought. In fact, the 'now' is 1) an objective characteristic, because the thing or res itself (the language system) is intrinsically tensed and historical, and 2) is a shared characteristic, because it belongs to all the items of the universe at that time, not only to the individual who utters the sentence.